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This paper examines whether Internet search advertising exhibits a weekend effect, a
substantial difference in the effectiveness of ad spending on weekends vs on weekdays. We
employ a data set from a major hotel chain, consisting of daily spending on search ads for
13 months, across three search engines and two brands. We find that there is a strong
weekend effect. Each dollar of ad spending on weekends delivers a lower sales return than
the corresponding return on weekdays. The advertising elasticity (percentage change in sales
for a percentage change in ad spending) is about 3.7% lower on weekends, which translates
to a 10% reduction in sales return at the mean level of daily spending. The weekend effect is
robust across the 6 combinations of search engines and brands. We show that the reduction in
advertising elasticity is primarily attributable to an increase in the price of clicks on weekends
rather than due to any differences in conversion rate of click-throughs to sales. Further, we
find that the weekend effect is exacerbated for ad spending at the top-ranked paid search
listings. Awareness of the weekend effect can help managers fine-tune the distribution of their
advertising budget across time, and achieve greater sales returns from a given ad budget.
Weekend Effect in Internet Search Advertising
1 Introduction
Information technologies and the Internet have transformed many industries and business
practices. One example is marketing communications. Not only has Internet search advertis-
ing exhibited explosive growth, it has also transformed the way in which firms can measure
the effectiveness of advertising. Traditionally, the link between advertising expenditures and
advertising effectiveness was measurable only in the aggregate. For instance, one could esti-
mate the effectiveness of ad expenditures over a few months across some broad geographical
segment of the market, but it was not cost-effective to measure the impact of every single
exposure to every single customer. The link between expenditures and sales could be in-
ferred through sophisticated statistical modeling, but was generally not directly observable,
leading to dubiety in attributing an outcome (such as a sale) to an advertising action. In
contrast, for Internet and search advertising, it is possible to trace the path—from an ad
impression to traffic at the firm’s web site to page views or product sales—for every single ad
exposure and every single customer. This transformation is an important qualitative shift
in the conduct of advertising. It ought to raise new questions about advertising effectiveness
and inspire development of new tools for allocating advertising resources more effectively.
This paper is concerned with one such question which has become viable to study be-
cause of how IT has enhanced the granularity and measurability of the effects of advertising.
We examine whether there exists a weekend effect in search advertising—i.e., whether ad
spending has systematically different payoff on weekends vs on weekdays—and whether the
difference is substantial enough to justify alternate allocation rules for different days of the
week. We investigate this effect empirically using a search advertising data set from a ma-
jor hotel chain. The data set provides daily-level observations (impressions, clicks, room
sales) for 395 days, accounting for about $3.8 million in ad spending across 2 search engines
1
and 3 brands. The data are distinctly suited to this day-level study because the informa-
tion technologies associated with search advertising ensure that the sales levels for each
day (attributed to clicks originating from search ads) are precisely linked with advertising
impressions and expenditures for that day.
There have been several empirical studies of the payoff from online advertising which has
become a substantial part of the economy.1 Yang and Ghose (2010) study whether and how
the effectiveness of paid search campaigns is influenced by the presence of organic listings,
and uncover a complementary relationship between the two. Another key component of the
advertising mechanism that determines outcomes is the position or rank of an ad. Position
effects have received much recent interest (e.g., Ghose and Yang (2009); Rutz and Trusov
(2011), among others). Narayanan and Kalyanam (2011) employ a regression discontinuity
approach to tease out the causal connection between an ad’s position and its likelihood of
generating a sale or some other desirable outcome. Existing studies have also looked at the
impacts of keyword characteristics (e.g., generic vs. branded) that capture consumer search
goals and intentions (e.g., Ghose and Yang (2009); Hu and Sheng (2010); Rutz and Bucklin
(2010); Yang and Ghose (2010)), and textual characteristics of the advertisement (Animesh
et al., 2010; Rutz and Trusov, 2011).
To our knowledge, the present paper is the first to examine a weekend effect (or, more
generally, day-of-week or calendar effect) in the payoff from advertising. In contrast, this
kind of effect is widely studied in other domains, such as finance, medicine, public health,
crime, etc. In medicine, several authors have claimed that medical outcomes are worse on
weekends, presumably due to lower staffing levels or less aggressive diagnostic testing. Cram
et al. (2004) found that mortality rates were higher for patients admitted to hospitals on
weekends rather than weekdays. Kostis et al. (2007) demonstrated a similar effect in the case
of cardiac patients. Jacob and Lefgren (2003) find a distinct shift in the pattern of juvenile
crimes on weekend and non-school days. In the retail shopping sector, Warner and Barsky
1An eMarketer Report (June 2011, http://www.emarketer.com/PressRelease.aspx?R=1008432) esti-





























































































































































































(b) Effect of demand-supply on CPC.
Figure 1: Panel (a) is based on Google Trends data on search activity in the travel sector. A
similar pattern is also observed for specific keywords in this sector, such as “hotel Chicago,”
and search volumes are lower across the board on weekends.
(1995) found, counterintuitively, that retail stores tend to implement greater discounts on
weekends (and holidays) despite the fact that shopping demand is exogenously high on these
days. A weekend effect in oﬄine metrics also can occur due to a weekend effect in online
search. For instance, Mantin and Koo (2009) find a strong weekend effect in price dispersion
for air travel, and attribute this to the lower Internet traffic during weekends which allows
airlines to adopt distinctive pricing policies during weekends. The finance literature, since the
seminal paper of French (1980), has ample discussion about a weekend or Monday effect in
stock trading. Even in the relatively staid area of supply chain order fulfillment, researchers
have found that operational performance metrics (order cycle time, complete orders fulfilled,
and short shipment percentage) exhibit a day-of-week effect (Yao et al., 2010).
Why might advertising effectiveness be any different on weekends? There are several
potential factors. First, there is general evidence that search activity is lower on weekends;
specifically, this is true in the hotel/travel sector studied in this paper (see Fig. 1(a)). This
reduces the supply of clicks available for grab by the entities (hotel reservation systems)
who are competing for these clicks. That, in turn, should raise the price of clicks on week-
ends, thereby lowering the return per unit of advertising expenditure ceteris paribus (see
Fig. 1(b)). Second, there is some evidence that consumers become more price-sensitive (or,
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equivalently, less time-sensitive) on weekends.2 For online search, Narayanan and Kalyanam
(2011) suggest that consumers dig deeper into search results; they may also be more likely
to follow more links (i.e., click and cause the advertiser to incur an expenditure) for every
purchase action. This suggests a lower conversion rate, hence lower ad effectiveness. Third,
however, some factors can improve ad effectiveness. There is some evidence that consumers
can be more decisive in making a shopping decision on weekends. Analysts in the insurance
industry have posited that a weekend ad is more likely to be effective, because consumers
are more available to connect with an insurance agent and more likely to reach a conclusion
after consulting with family members. The weekend effect, then, depends on the interplay
among these three factors. Establishing the existence and directionality of the weekend effect
requires rigorous modeling to isolate each of these effects.
We investigate the weekend effect on advertising effectiveness (degree of sales relative
to ad expenditures) and also decompose this effect into two parts, sales as a function of
clicks obtained from search advertising, and the purchase efficiency of clicks. We find that
advertising effectiveness is significantly lower for each dollar of ad spending on weekends,
and this effect holds in the aggregate as well as for each of the search engine-brand pairs in
our study. Moreover, we are able to attribute this lower ad effectiveness to a higher purchase
price for clicks rather than to lower conversion rates on weekends. Using daily trends in
search activity obtained from Google Trends, we connect this higher price-per-click, and
hence lower ad effectiveness, to a shift in the demand-supply curves for clicks on weekends.
Further, we examine the effect of search advertising position on the weekend effect, and we
find that this effect is more prominent at the top positions.
2 A Framework for Search Advertising Effectiveness
A few well-known characteristics of search advertising are worth repeating here because of
their relevance to our analysis. First, while traditional advertising is broadcast or “pushed”
2Optimizing the Ecommerce Experience: Trends for 2011. e-Marketer Report, October 2010.
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to users, search ads are delivered under a “pull” approach: they are displayed to a user
only after the user has expressed an interest in the product, firm, or at least a related set
of keywords. Due to this, search advertising is primarily oriented towards making sales (vs.
building general awareness of the brand), hence it provides a good setting to study advertising
effectiveness. Second, most search advertising is sold under a pay-for-performance paradigm,
under which an ad impression results in an ad expenditure only if the ad is clicked. Third,
the actions of the user subsequent to the display of the ad can be tracked, including whether
they click the ad and visit the firm’s web site, conduct any browsing activity, or make
a purchase. This provides measurability of both costs and benefits (sales). Fourth, the
infrastructure for search advertising allows for highly refined advertising strategies. It is
possible today for advertisers to specify the ads that will be displayed to users searching for
specific combinations of keywords, in essence allowing them to target ad spending to varying
dimensions including location, depth of search query, and price-sensitivity, among others.
However, little is known yet about the effectiveness of ad spending across different times,
specifically, days of the week.
We employ the oft-used conversion funnel paradigm for search advertising. The adver-
tising firm participates in a search advertising auction by creating several ad campaigns,
each of which specifies bidding rules for a collection of keywords (there are about 200 such
campaigns in our data set). Separate bidding rules may be specified for each search engine,
and each brand has its own advertising budget, typically determined each 3-month period.
A winning bid leads to an exposure, or an impression. With some probability an impression
converts to a click, at which time the winning bid converts into an ad expenditure (all our
data correspond to search advertising priced on a per-click rather than per-impression basis).
A fraction of these clicks converts to a sale which, in our study, is the reservation of a hotel
room.
Let Spendi,t represent the advertising expenditure corresponding to an index i (as speci-
fied later, the index is a triplet of ad campaign, search engine, and brand) on day t. Similarly,
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let Clicksi,t be the number of clicks, and Roomsi,t the number of room reservations for index i
on day t. Then,
Roomsi,t
Spendi,t
(room reservations per unit of ad spending) is an intuitive measure




as the clicks-per-dollar for index i on day t, the rate at which the firm buys traffic to its reser-
vation site. Similarly, the ratio
Roomsi,t
Clicksi,t
is the conversion rate. Intuitively, the effectiveness
of ad spending (and, likewise, the clicks-per-dollar and the conversion rate) need not be a
constant. One would expect clicks-per-dollar to exhibit diminishing marginal returns, with
each click being increasingly more expensive than the previous one. Similarly, conversion
rate might exhibit a nonlinear (and, specifically, diminishing returns) property. In order
to account for these possible nonlinearities, we employ a constant-elasticity Cobb-Douglas












where α1 and α2 are response elasticities for the click purchase and conversion processes,
respectively. The advertising elasticity α1α2 (=
%change in room sales
%change in ad spending
) then becomes the
key metric for the sales effectiveness of advertising expenditures (an elasticity less than 1
represents diminishing marginal returns).
Our key objective is to examine whether this advertising elasticity varies by day of the
week, and specifically over weekdays vs. weekends. We note that with the potential nonlin-




can no longer be interpreted
in the usual way as rates, and cannot meaningfully be compared across different indices if
the corresponding denominator variables differ in value. Rather, the respective elasticity—
which is agnostic to the magnitude of the denominator—is a useful measure for comparing
performance across different indices or day-of-week. We note that we define “weekend” more
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generally as inclusive of any NYSE designated holidays. For ease of exposition, we will refer
to this combination of days interchangeably as holidays or weekends. The working week days
will often be referred to as business days.
We refine Eq. 1–3 to account for potential differences in advertising effectiveness on
weekdays vs weekends. Assume that each of the weekdays has identical effectiveness, as
does each weekend day. Designate weekdays with B (for business days) and holidays or





1,B · γ2,B · Spendα1,B ·α2,Bi,t if t is a Business day
γ
α2,H
1,H · γ2,H · Spendα1,H ·α2,Hi,t if t is a Holiday.
(4)
To ease the notation, we rename and replace variables as follows. Let γ = γ
α2,B








; and, let α = α1,B · α2,B with αH = α1,H · α2,H − α1,B · α2,B. Then, Eq. 4 can
be shortened to
Roomsi,t = (γ · γHtH )Spend(α+αHHt)i,t (5)
where the indicator variable Ht = 1 if day t is a holiday and 0 otherwise. With this notation,
weekdays and weekends have indistinct ad effectiveness if αH = 0 and γH = 1.
3 Data and Estimation
dt holiday source brand campaignnm clicks spend rooms
2009-03-29 1 YAHOO Brand B 150 42 11.54 1
2009-04-06 0 YAHOO Brand A 115 65 20.64 6
2009-04-25 1 GOOGLE Brand G 35 411 1052.50 7
2009-04-13 0 YAHOO Brand G 34 346 865.52 21
Table 1: Sample of daily data for search advertising expenditures and sales.
Our data set represents 13 months of search advertising activity for a major multi-
















































































































































Figure 2: Variation in clicks over time and across weekends vs. weekdays.
advertising in this period. This spending reflects 6,158,157 clicks, of which 550,063 led to
room reservations, a conversion rate of a little less than 1%. Table 1 provides a sample of
the data. As noted earlier, we designated weekends and other bank holidays using the NYSE
holiday calendar. Our data are generated by 212 advertising campaigns, each of which is a
collection of relevant keywords purchased on a single search engine (Yahoo or Google) and
used to promote a single hotel brand.
Our research was motivated by the observation that the firm’s advertising levels on
weekends were substantially, and consistently, lower on weekends than on weekdays. Figure 2
displays the variation in daily clicks (from search advertising) received by the firm during
the study period, it demonstrates both seasonal variation and a reduction in clicks every
weekend. The latter is demonstrated more vividly by examining a shorter period more
closely as in Figure 3 which also demonstrates this pattern for other metrics, such as number
of impressions, advertising expenditures, and sales attributed to search advertising. This
initial observation led us to inquire whether the reduced spending on weekends was a result
of lower anticipated effectiveness of ad spending, or whether it represented a lost opportunity
for increasing sales through additional ad spending on weekends.
Table 2 lists the variables used in our empirical model. The three key metrics of interest
are Spendi,t, Clicksi,t and Roomsi,t, representing ad spending, clicks, and room sales for
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Table 2: Description of Variables
Variable Description
Spendi,t Amount of ad spending on campaign i on day t.
Clicksi,t Number of clicks (web traffic) due to ad spending for campaign i on day t.
Roomsi,t Count of room reservations owing to campaign i on day t. Measure of sales.
Ht Equals 1 if t is a holiday, 0 otherwise.
Bi A set of indicators for three brands, Brand A, Brand B, and Brand G.
Si Equals 1 if campaign i ran on search engine Yahoo!, 0 if Google.
Ji Equals 1 if campaign i was the Jumbo campaign, 0 otherwise.
Mt A set of indicators for 12 months.
Ci A set of indicators for 212 campaigns with (positive) clicks.
Table 3: Summary of variables for estimation sample, split by brand and search engine.
Source GOOGLE YAHOO Pooled
Brand Brand A Brand B Brand G Brand A Brand B Brand G
N 5893 6033 18892 5192 5326 13423 47070
Rooms 197484 163173 75766 50054 43383 20203 550063
Spend 828757.6 890315.2 1035662 398103.5 394464 297286.8 3844589
Clicks 1591231 1695621 1301910 563067 607427 398901 6158157

















































































































































Figure 3: Weekend volume (clicks, spending, room sales) is consistently lower than weekday
volume. The empty circles are weekdays, while the filled red boxes are weekends.
campaign i on day t. Table 3 provides summaries of the main variables split by the brand
corresponding to the campaign and the search engine on which it was run. Fortunately,
the six groups are nearly identical in the proportion of holidays vs. weekdays in their use of
advertising (for each group, about 28% of days in which advertising occurred were holidays),
suggesting that there were no selection effects in assigning advertising campaigns across days
of the week. However, as illustrated in Figure 3, both advertising activity and consumer
responses were lower on holidays. The advertising campaigns sold on average 12.36 rooms,
spent $81.17 and attracted 135.16 clicks per weekday as compared to holidays and weekends
where on average they sold 9.94 rooms, spent $67.02 and attracted 107.07 clicks.
As a starting point to understand whether the effectiveness of advertising varies across
holidays and weekdays, we compare average ratios pooled across brands and sources. These
simple average comparisons indicate that clicks cost more on holidays ($0.63) than weekdays
($0.60), and the amount of ad spend required to sell a unit room is also higher on holidays
($6.74) than weekdays ($6.56), whereas the number of clicks it takes to sell a room (the ratio
of clicks to rooms) is slightly lower for holidays (10.77) than weekends (10.94). However,
these comparisons are na¨ıve and do not take into account the differences in the size of the
campaigns, and campaign-specific unobservables (factors such as competitiveness, nature
of keywords, broad vs. exact match, among others) that may determine the differences
in the levels of spending across campaigns. In order to examine the issue rigorously, we
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build regression models to examine whether there exist differences in the effectiveness of ad
spending on sales across holidays and weekdays, after controlling for a variety of confounding
factors.
4 Ad Spending Effectiveness (Rooms on Spend)
In this section, we develop and implement an estimation strategy to measure the relationship
between advertising expenditures and room sales and to investigate whether the sales returns
from search advertising display a weekend effect. After establishing that such an effect
exists, we then examine (in §5) whether the differential returns are caused by differences in
conversion rates or by differences in the cost of purchasing clicks. §6 demonstrates that the
weekend effect is moderated by search rank, and that higher ranks (the top positions in the
search results) exhibit a greater intensity of weekend effect.
4.1 Estimation Strategy
Figure 4: Comparison of densities in empirical data with a Poisson distribution and a negative
binomial distribution.
Several characteristics of our data pose challenges in estimation. First, our primary out-
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come variable of interest, Rooms, is a count variable, calling for Poisson regression methods.
The average daily clicks-to-conversion rate, while low (a little less than 1%), is comparable
to rates typical for online advertising campaigns.3 However, this count variable displays
over-dispersion (mean daily reservations = 11.69, s.d. = 50.14) and positive skew (55% of
days have zero room sales) as depicted in Figure 4.
Second, the data are obtained from multiple campaigns, where each campaign consists of
a specific set of keywords advertising a single brand on a specific search engine. This cam-
paign structure naturally produces structural heterogeneity in the population that would
best be modeled using a mixture of Poisson processes, such as a negative binomial model
that provides a continuous mixture of Poisson distributions where the Poisson rates (hetero-
geneity) are modeled as a gamma distribution. Figure 4 confirms that the negative binomial
model provides a good fit to the observed sample data. We plot the observed distribu-
tion of Rooms with Poisson and Negative Binomial distributions with the same mean and
an estimated variance. The estimated mean is 11.69 and the over-dispersion parameter is
5.713.
Third, each campaign is observed for several days (mean = 290.02, s.d.= 102.27), ren-
dering the multi-day observations from a given campaign unlikely to be independent of each
other. For example, it could be the case that some campaigns or collections of keyword are
advertised with a primary goal of brand building rather than selling rooms, and may thus
fetch lower clicks and conversion per dollar of ad-spending compared to other campaigns that
are designed to sell. Further, if certain types of campaigns were more likely to be activated
or run on holidays and weekends (as compared to weekdays), treating multi-day observations
from the same campaign as independent would produce coefficients (of the weekend effect,
for instance) that are inconsistent.
Given these considerations, we employ negative binomial regression models that also




Accounting for the campaign structure allows us to control for campaign-specific invariant
unobservables (and observables) that may affect the daily relationships between spending,
rooms, and clicks, while the heterogeneity across campaigns is modeled using a negative
binomial distribution. As we show in more detail later, these models provide better fit than
alternate assumptions about the distribution of errors for our data.
The negative binomial regression model estimates the probability of an observed count,
conditional on an expected mean µi,t, which is parameterized as an exponential function of
the independent variables that affect the outcome in order to avoid negative estimates of
the expected value of the count outcome (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In a panel model,
the mixing over the gamma distribution is applied to all observations produced by a given
panel. In other words, the individual campaign fixed effect δi = e
αi is modeled as separable
and multiplicative, and applied commonly to all daily observations belonging to a particular
campaign i rather than separately to individual observations. This model was originally
proposed by Hausman et al. (1984).
We implement the above estimation strategy by regressing room sales on advertising
expenditures (Eq. 5) along with appropriate controls as shown below.
E[Roomsi,t | Spendi,t, i,t] = exp((β0 + β1 log(Spendi,t)) + (β2 + β3 log(Spendi,t))Ht
+ (β4 + β5 log(Spendi,t))Ji + (β6 + β7 log(Spendi,t))Bi
+ (β8 + β9 log(Spendi,t))Si + β10Mt + β11Ci + i,t)
(6)
where i represents campaigns and t represents month. Dummies B and S allow the effect on
spending to vary across brands and search engines, respectively. We also includes dummies
(C) for the individual campaigns in order to allow for the intercepts (the effect of log(Spend))
to differ. Additionally, we include the interactions B∗ log(Spend) and S∗ log(Spend) to allow
for the effect of ad spending to vary across brands and search engines. Finally, we include two
additional controls, (i) a vector of dummy variables (for 12 months M) that help account for
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seasonality effects in search advertising activities, and (ii) a dummy J to control for the effects
of one jumbo master campaign (which included observations across all six combinations of
brand and search engine), which accounted for nearly 50% of the observed clicks in our data,
and may have experienced different levels of effectiveness for its ad spending as compared to
the rest of the smaller campaigns. Each of the bold face terms β6 . . .β11 represents a vector
of parameters corresponding to the respective vectors of dummy variables (B is brand, S is
search engine, M is month, and C is campaign).
With the negative binomial regression model, the expected value of the outcome variable
y, given the dependent variable x, is E[yi,t | xi,tδi] = exp(xi,tβ +αi) = µi,tδi. Eq. 6 provides
a “conditional” fixed effects estimator, where the campaign level fixed effects are conditioned
on the sum of the sales counts within the panel and then concentrated out of the likelihood
so that the fixed effects can take on any population distribution that need not be specified.
This remedies the need to include a host of dummy intercepts especially when the number
of panels is large. Further, a fixed effect estimator allows the panel-specific fixed effects
to be correlated with explanatory variables xi,t. Our main dependent variable of interest
- H (Holiday) - however appears to be uniformly distributed across sources and brands,
suggesting that campaigns nested within these groups (when aggregated) are not correlated
with H. If this was the case, fixed effect models would still produce consistent estimates.
However, due to the conditioning, campaigns whose total counts of rooms sold (across all
days) are zero are dropped from the estimation sample since there is no variation over time.
This model further assumes that observations across panels are independent which is a
reasonable assumption for our daily sales data across campaigns.
To address the concerns related to a conditional fixed effects estimator (i.e., that it may
not truly control for all time invariant panel effects unlike an unconditional estimator, see
Allison and Waterman (2002)), we also present random effects estimates for the negative
binomial regression models. In this model too, the heterogeneity parameter is commonly
allocated to all observations belonging to a campaign, but is assumed to be i.i.d randomly
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distributed according to a beta distribution. Specifically, the dispersion parameter defined as
the variance divided by the mean follows a beta distribution. A limitation of random effects
models is the assumption that panel-specific effects are uncorrelated with other predictors.
However, as described above, this may not be a concern for the weekend effect.
4.2 Results
The parameters β2 and β3 measure whether there is a difference in advertising effectiveness
between weekdays and weekends (note that eβ2 = γH and β3 = αH , in Eq. 5). β2 > 0 (< 0),
and similarly β3 > 0 (< 0), indicates a higher (lower) level of return on weekends. However,
β2 impacts only the absolute return on advertising for a given level of spending, but cancels
out when we compute the percentage change in sales as advertising expenditure changes.
This latter effect is better captured by the parameter β3, which represents the difference in
advertising elasticity on weekends. Hence the discussion below primarily centers on β3.
The results for the regression of Rooms on Spend are presented in Table 4. Columns (1)
and (2), corresponding to fixed and random dispersion across campaigns, represent regression
of Rooms on log(Spend) and its interactions with Holiday (H), Brand (B), Search engine
(S). In Columns (3) and (4) we add a dummy variable to control for the jumbo master
campaign, and we add month dummies in Columns (5) and (6). Results in columns (1),
(3), (5) are estimates from fixed effect models, while the results in columns (2), (4), (6) are
estimates from random effect models. The model with the best fit (in terms of BIC score
for non-nested models) in Table 4 is in Column (5) which is a conditional fixed effect model
where we control for both month effects and the jumbo campaign. In all of the models, the
coefficient of the log(Spend) term confirms the suitability of employing a diminishing returns
specification (this coefficient would have been close to 1 under a linear relationship).
The coefficient for H∗log(Spend) is -0.019, negative and significant in Column (5) (as also
in other models). Given the negative binomial distribution of the outcome, the coefficient can
be interpreted as an elasticity value since the independent variable is also logged. Therefore,
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Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression of Rooms on log(Spend).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE1 RE1 FE2 RE2 FE3 RE3
H -0.027 -0.026 0.025 0.026 0.009 0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
log(Spend) 0.464*** 0.467*** 0.580*** 0.583*** 0.509*** 0.512***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
H X log(Spend) -0.012* -0.012* -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Brand B -0.893*** -0.881*** -0.765*** -0.753*** -0.737*** -0.728***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Brand B X log(Spend) 0.038*** 0.036** 0.009 0.008 0.099*** 0.097***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Brand G -1.879*** -1.888*** -1.666*** -1.672*** -1.815*** -1.820***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
Brand G X log(Spend) 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.166*** 0.165***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
YAHOO 0.029 0.034 0.038 0.044 0.023 0.029
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
YAHOO X log(Spend) -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.112*** -0.113***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
J 1.098*** 1.111*** 0.855*** 0.866***
(0.099) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098)
J X log(Spend) -0.245*** -0.247*** -0.178*** -0.180***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Intercept -0.498*** -0.508*** -0.839*** -0.849*** -0.732*** -0.741***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.049) (0.049) (0.054) (0.053)
BIC 184731.25 187746.24 184461.81 18747.13 182524.24 185531.96
Notes: (∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001). N = 47070 and campaign groups = 212 across all
models. Models (1), (3), (5) are panel negative binomial regression models where the dispersion
across campaigns is conditioned out of the likelihood providing a conditional fixed effects model.
Models (2), (4), (6) are panel negative binomial regression models where the dispersion is modeled
using a beta distribution and varies randomly across campaigns. Models (3)-(6) control for a Jumbo
campaign, and Models (5)-(6) also contain 12 Month dummies.
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we see that the advertising elasticity for weekend ad spending is lower by an amount 0.019
relative to its weekday value of 0.509, a reduction in elasticity of 3.73% (averaged across all
brand and search engine pairs). With these elasticities, Eq. 5 can be used to compute the
difference between room sales on a weekday or weekend, for a given level of ad spending.
For instance, at the mean daily spending level (≈ $127), the firm will generate about 8.79%
lower returns on a weekend compared with a weekday. Similar findings are obtained in the
alternate fixed and random model specifications presented in Table 4. Hence we can conclude
that the effectiveness of ad spending is significantly reduced on holidays and weekends as
compared to weekdays.
We assessed the robustness of the holiday or weekend effect using a number of alternate
model specifications for the regression of Rooms on Spend (see Table 5). For comparison
purposes, Column (1) presents the results from the best panel model in Column (5) of
Table 4. Column (2) is a NB-2 model proposed by Cameron and Trivedi (2005), and assumes
additive separable log-gamma distributed heterogeneity in the Poisson process. Let θ denote
the dispersion parameter (variance of the one-parameter Gamma distribution used to model
heterogeneity with the mean fixed at unity), then the variance of the NB-2 distribution is
given as var(Roomsi,t;µi,t) = µi,t+θµ
2
i,t. Column (3) is a generalized negative binomial model
where the heterogeneity parameter (shape of the gamma distribution) itself is parameterized
to allow model predictors to influence over-dispersion. We specify a function ln(θ) = ρ0 +
ρ1B(i) + ρ2S(i) + ρ3Ht + ρ4Ji + ξi,t. Both models (2) and (3) include a full set of campaign
dummies, C, to control for fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected by scaling by the
dispersion parameter, as suggested by Allison and Waterman (2002). Finally Column (4)
presents results from a fixed effects Poisson regression model. Hausman et al. (1984) showed
that a fixed effect Poisson would yield unbiased (albeit inefficient) estimates, and can be a
useful robustness check.
Both the negative binomial models with campaign dummies provide comparable, though
lower, fits to the model in Column (1). The Poisson panel model however is a poor fit. In
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Table 5: Robustness Checks for the weekend effect (Rooms on log(Spend)).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NB-FE NB2 GenNB Pois-FE
H 0.009 0.046 0.041 0.019
(0.025) (0.038) (0.032) (0.040)
log(Spend) 0.509*** 0.810*** 0.765*** 0.749***
(0.013) (0.050) (0.056) (0.035)
H X log(Spend) -0.019*** -0.017* -0.023** -0.025**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Brand B X log(Spend) 0.099*** -0.174*** -0.156*** -0.142***
(0.013) (0.038) (0.043) (0.035)
Brand G X log(Spend) 0.166*** -0.303*** -0.281*** -0.306***
(0.016) (0.076) (0.070) (0.046)
YAHOO X log(Spend) -0.112*** -0.020 -0.042 -0.176***
(0.011) (0.054) (0.067) (0.049)
J X log(Spend) -0.178*** -0.025 0.006 -0.078*









Intercept -0.732*** -3.311*** -5.290***
(0.054) (0.193) (0.135)
BIC 182524.24 189847.876 185263.770 269011.11
Notes: ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. N = 47070 and campaign groups = 212 across all
models. The dependent variable is Rooms. Model (1) is a negative binomial regression model with
conditional fixed effects. Models (2)-(3) are negative binomial regression models. The dispersion
is a function of the mean of the covariates in model (2), while model (3) specifies a generalized
parameterization of dispersion such that ln(dispersion) = f(Brand B, Brand G, Yahoo, Holiday,
Jumbo). Both (3) and (4) include dummy variables for 212 campaigns and standard error correction
for the campaign clusters. Model (4) is a panel Poisson fixed effects regression model. All models
contain 12 Month dummies and control for a Jumbo campaign.
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particular, the standard errors are downward biased and the ratio of deviance to the degrees
of freedom is not close to 1, indicating the presence of significant over-dispersion remaining
within panels that is not accounted for in the model. In all these models, we still continue to
obtain a negative and significant weekend effect, with a reduction in advertising elasticity of
.017-.025 on weekends as compared to weekdays. We conducted three additional robustness
checks: (i) added day controls using calendar days, (ii) included a lagged effect of sales from
the previous day, and (iii) included a lagged effect of the previous day’s ad spending. All
these variations produced similar findings on the weekend effect, hence we do not present
these results here. We also tested a zero-inflated negative binomial model, but it produced
poorer fit than the negative binomial models discussed above.
5 Decomposing the Weekend Effect
Having established the presence of a statistically significant and economically relevant week-
end effect in online search advertising, we now seek to understand the source of this effect.
The typical conversion funnel described earlier suggests that the translation of advertising
spend into room sale occurs through two intermediate steps. The first is the cost of pur-
chasing clicks, or the clicks obtained by the firm for every dollar spent. The second is the
effectiveness of clicks, or the rate at which clicks convert to room reservations. We examine
whether the weekend effect is driven by the reduced acquisition of clicks for each dollar of
spending or the reduced conversion effectiveness of the obtained clicks. More importantly,
disparate factors are likely to determine the number of clicks an advertisement attracts on
a search engine and the number of sales the advertisement produces once the ad has been
clicked on, and additionally the impact of these factors may vary across weekdays and hol-
idays. Examining these two processes separately can better help understand the source of
the weekend effect. These two models are described next.
First we estimate the effect of the number of clicks on the amount of room sales. The
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regression of Rooms on Clicks is best modeled using a negative binomial distribution for the
outcome since Rooms is a count, as discussed earlier. As before, we log the main independent
variable, Clicks, to specify a model of diminishing returns in the conversion of clicks to room
sales. This allows us to interpret the coefficient of interest - γ3 - as an elasticity coefficient.
E[Roomsi,t | Clicksi,t, i,t] = exp((γ0 + γ1 log(Clicksi,t)) + (γ2 + γ3 log(Clicksi,t))Ht
+ (γ4 + γ5 log(Clicksi,t))Ji + (γ6 + γ7 log(Clicksi,t))Bi
+ (γ8 + γ9 log(Clicksi,t))Si + γ10Mt + γ11Ci + i,t)
(7)
Table 6 presents the results for the regression of Rooms on Clicks corresponding to the
models shown in Table 5. We estimated a variety of panel negative binomial models, and
the best fit was provided by the fixed effects model. This model is presented in Column (1)
in Table 6. In Columns (2) and (3) are a NB-2 and a generalized negative binomial model,
and in Column (4), we have a fixed effect panel Poisson model. As before, Column (4) has
the lowest fit due to the presence of remaining over-dispersion, whereas the models (2) and
(3) have comparatively better fit, with the negative binomial fixed effects model in column
(1) providing the lowest BIC score. After taking into account the effects of other covariates,
we find that the coefficient of the interaction H ∗ log(Clicks) is statistically insignificant (see
Column (1) of Table 6). This result is also observed in columns (2) (3), and (4), and suggests
that the rate of conversion of clicks to room sales is not significantly different across weekdays
and holidays.
Next we regress Clicks on Spend in order to examine the rate at which advertising ex-
penditure (bids, to buy clicks) generates clicks. The Clicks variable, unlike Rooms, does
not suffer from the presence of excess zeros, and log(Clicks) has an approximately normal
distribution. We therefore estimate a model of log(Clicks) on log(Spend). The coefficient of
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Table 6: Regression of Rooms on Clicks (∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001). N = 47070
and campaign groups = 212 across all models. The dependent variable is Rooms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NB-FE NB2-3 GenNB-3 Pois-FE2
H 0.051 0.033 0.015 -0.039
(0.043) (0.063) (0.056) (0.082)
log(Clicks) 0.762*** 0.886*** 0.921*** 1.079***
(0.015) (0.046) (0.065) (0.072)
H X log(Clicks) -0.011 0.000 0.001 0.013
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018)
Brand B X log(Clicks) -0.004 0.069 -0.074 -0.394***
(0.016) (0.057) (0.094) (0.103)
Brand G X log(Clicks) 0.107*** 0.027 -0.011 -0.241***
(0.018) (0.054) (0.063) (0.054)
YAHOO X log(Clicks) 0.006 -0.049 -0.033 -0.095
(0.013) (0.041) (0.079) (0.069)
J X log(Clicks) -0.192*** -0.169 -0.180 -0.269***









Intercept -2.345*** -6.371*** -6.045***
(0.075) (0.159) (0.210)
BIC 179897.72 189459.276 184335.293 255244.7
Notes: Model (1) is a negative binomial regression models with unconditional fixed effects. Models
(2)-(3) are negative binomial regression models. The dispersion is a function of the mean of the
covariates in model (2), while model (3) specifies a generalized parameterization of dispersion such
that ln(dispersion) = f(Brand B, Brand G, Yahoo, Holiday, Jumbo). Both (3) and (4) include
dummy variables for 212 campaigns and standard error correction for the campaign clusters. Model
(4) is a panel Poisson fixed effects regression model. All models contain 12 Month dummies and
control for a Jumbo campaign.
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interest, ω3, can again be interpreted as an elasticity coefficient.
log(Clicks) = (ω0 + ω1 log(Spendi,t)) + (ω2 + ω3 log(Spendi,t))Ht
+ (ω4 + ω5 log(Spendi,t))Ji + (ω6 + ω7 log(Spendi,t))Bi
+ (ω8 + ω9 log(Spendi,t))Si + ω10Mt + ω11Ci + i,t
(8)
Table 7 states the results regarding the relationship between Clicks and Spend using
linear panel regression. In Column (1), we present a fixed effect model followed by a random
effect model in Column (2). The coefficient of H ∗ log(Spend) is negative and statistically
significant. The results suggest that every dollar of ad spending produces lower returns in
terms of clicks received on holidays when compared to weekdays. The estimated elasticity of
returns is 0.013 lower on holidays, indicating that for every $127 dollars of ad spending, the
number of clicks acquired would be about 6.5% lower on holidays as compared to weekdays.
Hence the results suggest that clicks cost more to purchase on holidays than on weekdays.
Taken together, our set of results in Tables 6 and 7 support the presence of a significant
weekend effect - a reduced effectiveness of advertising dollars on room sales. Further the
results indicate that this weekend effect is attributable to the higher cost of (acquiring) clicks
on holidays, rather than due to differences in the conversion of clicks to sales on weekdays
vs. holidays. The results are robust across the three brands and two search engines in our
study, as vividly illustrated in Figure 5. Panel A shows that each of our 6 combinations of
search engine and brand exhibits a reduction in advertising elasticity on weekends. Panel
B indicates that there is no difference in conversion rates, while Panel C shows that the
purchase price for clicks is higher on weekends for each combination.
6 Effect of Position and Consumer Search Behavior
§4.2 demonstrated that the sales effectiveness of paid search advertising is significantly re-
duced on weekends (Table 4), plausibly because of the higher cost of acquiring clicks (Ta-
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Table 7: Regression of Clicks on Spend (∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001). N = 47070 and







H X log(Spend) -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
Brand B X log(Spend) -0.088*** -0.088***
(0.025) (0.024)
Brand G X log(Spend) -0.110*** -0.110***
(0.023) (0.023)
YAHOO X log(Spend) -0.114*** -0.113***
(0.024) (0.023)













Notes: Model (1) is a linear panel regression model with fixed effects, while model (2) is a linear
panel regression model with random effects. Both models contain 12 Month dummies and control for






















































































































































bles 6–7 in §5). Our analysis employed an aggregate of spending and sales (and clicks)
metrics over all search ranks or positions. In this section, we take the analyses a step further
to examine whether the observed weekend effect applies uniformly to all positions in the
paid search listings, or if the effect is more pronounced in the top (or bottom) ranks of the
listings.
To understand why search advertising position might moderate or alter the weekend
effect, consider the search behaviors or patterns of consumers apropos paid search listings.
For simplicity, suppose that we can partition the space of ranks into “top” ranks and “low”
ranks. There is some evidence that conversion rates (the fraction of clicks that lead to sales)
are lower at the top ranks than at low ranks (Agarwal et al., forthcoming), and we also observe
this property in our data set. Even if the rates were the same, spending on the low-ranked
positions would generate higher normalized returns (i.e., in terms of advertising elasticity)
because those positions have a lower cost per click. Hence the low-ranked positions have a
more favorable payoff ratio than the top-ranked positions. Now, while the firm received far
fewer total clicks on weekends (see Figure 1), the drop in clicks primarily occurred at the top
ranks and was negligible for the low ranks (see Figure 6). In other words, on weekends the
firm spent a greater fraction of its ad spending on positions that have a more favorable payoff
ratio (than the corresponding fraction on weekdays). Therefore, the observed reduction in
advertising effectiveness on weekends (discussed in §4.2) must primarily be driven by the top
positions, and be even more pronounced for top positions than the aggregate effect described
in §4.2.
Estimating the effect of position on sales is usually complicated due to the endogeneity
between the firms’ bidding strategies and payoffs from advertising. Recently, researchers
have proposed various techniques to examine and isolate the causal effect of position (see
e.g., Narayanan and Kalyanam (2011)). However, we are interested only in the weekend
effect across different positions—i.e., whether the variation in advertising elasticity across
weekdays and weekends itself differs across top and bottom positions in the paid search
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listings—rather than the causal effect of position on outcomes. Therefore, we can address
























Figure 6: Average Daily Clicks across Position for Weekdays and Holidays
We examine this intuition about the impact of position on the weekend effect. We denote
top ranks as those above the mean average daily position or rank obtained by all the adver-
tisements (2.95, in our sample). We define a new binary variable LOW to indicate low ranks
(LOW=1) vs. top ranks (LOW=0). We use the interactions LOW*H, LOW*log(Spend),
and LOW*H*log(Spend) to calculate the impact of position on the weekend effect. Table 8
presents the results of three models for the regression of Rooms on Spend after incorporating
a dummy variable for low vs. top ranks. The first is a pooled model. We start with the
negative binomial model presented in Table 4, and include a set of position effects. We also
present an alternative specification—two split-sample models focusing on just the top ranks
(Column (2)) and low ranks (Column (3))—which facilitates interpretation of the effect.
The results in Table 8 provide evidence of a difference in the weekend effect for top vs.
low ranks. Consider Column (2), where the coefficient of H∗log(Spend) is -0.024, relative to -
0.019 for the aggregate analysis presented in §4.2. Recall that, aggregated across all positions,
the firm’s return from advertising on weekends was 8.79% lower on weekends, at the mean
daily spending level of ≈ $127. Computing the corresponding numbers for ad spending on
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hence we find that the weekend effect is stronger for the top ranks, and is not statistically
significant at the low ranks (Column (3)). The same finding can be derived by combining
multiple coefficients from Column (1). The finding is robust to alternative specifications
(Columns (4-6) are generalized negative binomial models) and alternative thresholds for low
vs. top ranks (see Columns (7)-(8), which are the split-sample models using a more extreme
definition of top (< 2) and low ranks (> 7)). This finding sharpens our insights regarding the
weekend effect. Moreover, since a significant share of the paid search advertising spending
occurs in the top positions, the presence of a significant reduction in advertising effectiveness
there underscores the importance of the weekend effect.
7 Conclusion
One of the essential characteristics of the Internet and Internet-based commerce is that it is
an always open 24/7/365 system, agnostic to time of day, day of week, or other such temporal
characteristics. Yet, societal and cultural factors dictate that user activity on the Internet
will vary along these temporal dimensions. This variation suggests that, with respect to
Internet commerce, business decisions and resource allocation policies ought to be sensitive
to these temporal dimensions. For instance, in search advertising, the price (of each keyword)
and spending level is determined through real-time auctions where multiple firms compete
to display their ads alongside search results, typically employing an automated system that
governs its bids and other parameters of participation in these real-time auctions. Should
an advertiser’s bidding strategies involve a temporal component? Should they employ the
same, or different, allocation rules at different periods within a day, week, or month?
Our findings about the weekend effect are relevant to managers and firms because paid
search is a highly data-driven and measurable form of advertising. To our knowledge, media
managers do not presently configure their bidding strategies by day-of-week, primarily due
to lack of awareness of a weekend effect. Therefore our work introduces an additional metric
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or lever with which managers can fine-tune and optimize their advertising expenditures on
paid search. This recommendation is immediately actionable because all leading search
engines already offer “day-parting” rules which allow bidding strategies to be customized by
day of week (or time of day). Moreover, while we demonstrated the weekend effect in the
specific context of the hotel and travel sector, it is plausible that it holds more generally
because it is caused by a reduction in search activity on weekends, a phenomenon that is
widespread across many industries and products. It would also be useful for managers to
examine whether the weekend effect can be refined into a day-of-week effect, which would
then motivate further tuning of bidding and budget allocation strategies.
We are pursuing certain additional directions on this topic. While this draft describes a
weekend effect, a natural follow-on question is whether media managers are already taking
this into account in making their spending decisions. We can address this question by com-
paring the marginal performance of advertising expenditures across weekdays and weekends.
Additionally, it would also be of interest to examine whether the weekend effect is moderated
by the nature of the advertising campaign. For instance, paid search advertisements that
allow retailers to target particular brands to specific geographic (local vs. national) mar-
kets may differ in the advertising elasticity across weekdays and holidays. Finally, while we
control for the multitude of campaigns, useful insights could emerge from studying whether
there exist interdependencies or synergies in sales generated from spending across campaigns,
and whether they varied across weekdays and holidays. These refinements can lead to a
better understanding of advertising effectiveness and the weekend effect.
References
Agarwal, A., K. Hosanagar, and M. D. Smith (forthcoming): “Location, Location,
Location: An Analysis of Profitability of Position in Online Advertising Markets,” Journal
of Marketing Research.
29
Allison, P. D. and R. P. Waterman (2002): “Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regres-
sion Models,” Sociological Methodology, 32, 247–265.
Animesh, A., S. Viswanathan, and R. Agarwal (2010): “Competing “Creatively” in
Sponsored Search Markets: The Effect of Rank, Differentiation Strategy, and Competition
on Performance,” Information Systems Research, 22, Forthcoming.
Cameron, C. A. and P. K. Trivedi (2005): Microeconometrics, no. 9780521848053 in
Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press.
Cram, P., S. Hillis, M. Barnett, and G. Rosenthal (2004): “Effects of weekend
admission and hospital teaching status on in-hospital mortality,” The American Journal
of Medicine, 117, 151–157.
French, K. R. (1980): “Stock returns and the weekend effect,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 8, 55–69.
Ghose, A. and S. Yang (2009): “An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine Advertising:
Sponsored Search in Electronic Markets,” Management Science, 1605–1622.
Hausman, J., B. H. Hall, and Z. Griliches (1984): “Econometric Models for Count
Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship,” Econometrica, 52, 909–38.
Hu, H. and O. R. Sheng (2010): “Online Retail Keyword Characteristics and Search
Marketing Performance,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Information
Systems, St Louis, MO.
Jacob, B. A. and L. Lefgren (2003): “Are Idle Hands the Devil’s Workshop? Inca-
pacitation, Concentration, and Juvenile Crime,” The American Economic Review, 93, pp.
1560–1577.
Kostis, W. J., K. Demissie, S. W. Marcella, Y.-H. Shao, A. C. Wilson, and
30
A. E. Moreyra. (2007): “Weekend versus Weekday Admission and Mortality from
Myocardial Infarction,” New England Journal of Medicine, 356, 1099–1109.
Mantin, B. and B. Koo (2009): “Weekend effect in airfare pricing,” Journal of Air
Transport Management.
Narayanan, S. and K. Kalyanam (2011): “Measuring Causal Position Effects in Search
Advertising: A Regression Discontinuity Approach,” .
Rutz, O. and R. E. Bucklin (2010): “From Generic to Branded: A Model of Spillover
in Paid Search Advertising,” Journal of Marketing Research, 602–623.
Rutz, O. and M. Trusov (2011): “Zooming in on Paid Search Ads–A Consumer-Level
Model Calibrated on Aggregated Data,” Marketing Science.
Warner, E. J. and R. B. Barsky (1995): “The Timing and Magnitude of Retail Store
Markdowns: Evidence from Weekends and Holidays,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 110, 321–52.
Yang, S. and A. Ghose (2010): “Analyzing the Relationship Between Organic and Spon-
sored Search Advertising: Positive, Negative, or Zero Interdependence?” Marketing Sci-
ence, 602–623.
Yao, Y. O., M. Dresner, and K. Zhu (2010): “Searching for the ’Monday Blues’ in
Order Fulfillment and its Cure,” Tech. rep.
31
